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INTRODUCTION 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)1 dramatically expanded the 
definition of “disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 
Several scholars, including me, have been exploring the case law in this post-
ADAAA era.3 One area that has not been explored, however, is the body of re-
taliation cases under the ADA, post Amendments. This article fills that gap. It 
is an empirical project aimed at exploring ADA retaliation cases decided after 
the Amendments went into effect. 
Prior to the ADAAA, many courts dismissed plaintiffs’ retaliation claims 
based on an application of the “reasonable belief” rule. The reasonable belief 
rule states that if an employee opposes employer conduct that the employee 
reasonably believes violates the law, the employee has engaged in “protected 
activity” even if the employee was incorrect about whether the employer’s 
conduct actually violated the law.4 Although this rule might appear to be plain-
tiff friendly, prior to the Amendments in 2008, the rule operated to exclude 
many ADA retaliation claims. Before the Amendments, many employees re-
quested an accommodation or complained about discrimination or harassment 
based on the belief that they had a disability protected by the ADA. But be-
cause courts had so narrowly interpreted the definition of disability, courts 
would often dismiss the retaliation claim, stating that the employee could not 
have reasonably believed that she had a disability; and therefore, could not 
have reasonably believed she was opposing unlawful behavior by the employ-
er.5 Now that the definition of disability has been dramatically expanded by the 
ADAAA, one might expect that employees overcame a major hurdle to suc-
ceeding on their retaliation claims. 
                                                        
1  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 355. 
2  See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2014) [hereinafter Porter, Backlash] (discussing the broadened definition of disability under 
the ADA Amendments Act). 
3  See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA 
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2031 (2013); Jeannette Cox, Crossroads 
and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 189 (2010); Alex B. 
Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 224–28 (2008); Porter, 
Backlash, supra note 2, at 4; Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New 
Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 941 (2012). 
4  See infra Section I.B.1. 
5  See infra Section I.B.1. 
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In this article, I set out to explore what effect the expansion of the defini-
tion of “disability” would have on the post-Amendments retaliation cases. 
What I discovered surprised me. Despite the common belief that retaliation 
cases are often more successful than cases alleging status-based discrimina-
tion,6 this did not prove to be true with respect to this dataset of ADA retalia-
tion cases. In fact, as indicated by the title of this article, courts are continuing 
to disable employees’ retaliation claims under the ADA. Plaintiffs lost (i.e., did 
not survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) in three-
quarters of all post-ADAAA retaliation cases in my dataset.7 
In order to understand how courts are disabling ADA retaliation cases, a 
very brief primer on the requirements of proving retaliation is necessary. Prov-
ing retaliation under the ADA first requires the plaintiff to demonstrate her 
prima facie case. This requires her to prove: (1) that she engaged in protected 
activity—either participating in a lawsuit or a charge before the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or that she opposed conduct by 
her employer that she believed violated the ADA; (2) that she suffered an ad-
verse employment action; and (3) that her protected activity caused the adverse 
employment action.8 If she can meet this prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the employer to demonstrate that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for the adverse employment action.9 As this is a very easy burden to meet, the 
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the reason given by the 
employer was pretextual and that the real reason was retaliation.10 
Courts are using each of these elements or steps to disable ADA retaliation 
cases. First, many courts continue to use the “reasonable belief” rule to limit 
ADA protection against retaliation. They often accomplish this by holding that 
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that that the accommodation she 
was requesting was reasonable or required.11 Second, some courts dismiss 
plaintiffs’ claims by limiting the scope of what constitutes an adverse employ-
ment action, holding that adverse actions alleged by the plaintiff were too mi-
nor or trivial to be actionable.12 Third, many ADA retaliation case are dis-
missed on causation grounds, with courts often holding that the temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action 
                                                        
6  See, e.g., Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 375, 377 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court often finds in favor of plaintiffs 
in retaliation cases—“a conclusion that would strike many commentators as odd given the 
Court’s decidedly mixed record of protecting employee rights”); David Sherwyn et al., Ex-
perimental Evidence that Retaliation Claims Are Unlike Other Employment Discrimination 
Claims, 44 SETON HALL. L. REV. 455, 478 (2014) (stating that, compared to discrimination, 
“retaliation is easier for employees to identify and juries to understand”). 
7  See infra Section II.A–B (describing the methodology of the study and the results). 
8  See infra Section I.B. 
9  See infra Section II.B.4. 
10  See infra Section II.B.4. 
11  See infra Section II.B.1. 
12  See infra Section II.B.2. 
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was not enough to prove causation.13 And fourth, many cases were dismissed 
because the courts held that the plaintiff could not prove pretext.14 
This article proceeds in four additional parts. Part I will describe the law of 
ADA retaliation cases. Part II will describe the study, first explaining my meth-
odology, and then providing the results of the study, including examples of the 
reasons courts dismissed so many ADA retaliation cases. This Part will also 
provide examples of successful cases that survived summary judgment. Part III 
will explore the implications of this study. Finally, this article will briefly con-
clude. 
I. ADA RETALIATION CASES 
Consistent with the other employment discrimination statutes,15 the ADA 
prohibits employers from retaliating against any individual who complains 
about disability discrimination, or files or participates in a claim alleging disa-
bility discrimination under the ADA.16 Retaliation cases under all of the em-
ployment discrimination statutes are very common.17 This is because, when an 
employee believes that he has been discriminated against or harassed because 
of a protected class, he often (but certainly not always) complains to his em-
ployer about it or files a charge with the EEOC (or its state equivalent). If the 
employer then takes an “adverse employment action” against the employee, he 
will likely claim retaliation in addition to the underlying discrimination claim. 
This can and does happen in the ADA context. What makes ADA retaliation 
cases perhaps even more prevalent is that an employee with a disability has the 
right to request a “reasonable accommodation” if needed to allow the employee 
to perform the essential functions of her job.18 And, as will be discussed below, 
requesting an accommodation under the ADA is “protected activity,” just as 
complaining to the employer is protected activity.19 Because many employees 
with disabilities request accommodations, and because these requests are con-
sidered protected activity, any adverse employment action taken by the em-
ployer because of the request for an accommodation can and will be seen as re-
taliation. 
                                                        
13  See infra Section II.B.3. 
14  See infra Section II.B.4. 
15  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation for filing a charge or opposing a 
practice made unlawful by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation for filing a charge or opposing a practice made 
unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
16  See infra Section I.A. 
17  Craig Robert Senn, Redefining Protected “Opposition” Activity in Employment Retalia-
tion Cases, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2035, 2040 (2016) (stating that, by 2014 the frequency of 
retaliation claims filed with the EEOC had increased to 42.8 percent and now are the single 
most popular claim filed with the EEOC). 
18  42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
19  See Section I.B.1. 
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A. The ADA’s Anti-Retaliation Provisions 
The ADA’s primary anti-retaliation provision provides that: 
“(a) Retaliation 
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individu-
al has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because 
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner 
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”20 
This provision is almost identical in language to the anti-retaliation provi-
sion in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 The ADA is a bit unique in 
that it adds a second provision to its retaliation section, which states: 
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation 
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, or interfere with any individual in the 
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or en-
joyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individ-
ual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chap-
ter.22 
In my experience and perhaps surprisingly, the section quoted immediately 
above does not get litigated very much. Most of the ADA retaliation cases 
claim violations of the main anti-retaliation provision. 
B. Elements of an ADA Retaliation Claim 
The elements of an ADA retaliation claim are similar to retaliation claims 
under Title VII—in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plain-
tiff must establish: (1) that she engaged in protected activity, (2) that she suf-
fered an adverse employment action, and (3) causation (that the protected activ-
ity caused the adverse employment action).23 
1. Protected Activity 
The first element, engaging in protected activity, is said to encompass two 
different actions—opposition or participation. Participation is the more 
straight-forward of the two. It usually involves either filing a charge with the 
                                                        
20  42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012). 
21  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, . . . to dis-
criminate against any individual . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchap-
ter.”). 
22  42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012). 
23  See, e.g., Credeur v. Louisiana, 860 F.3d 785, 797 (5th Cir. 2017); Frazier-White v. Gee, 
818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016); Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 817 F.3d 624, 632 
(8th Cir. 2016); Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013); Hen-
nagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009); Alvarado v. Cajun Oper-
ating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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EEOC (or an equivalent agency at the state level), participating in an investiga-
tion by the EEOC, or filing a complaint in court.24 Opposition activity encom-
passes less formal complaints of discrimination, usually made to a supervisor or 
a human resources representative.25 Perhaps not surprisingly, these informal 
complaints (opposition) are much more prevalent than more formal complaints 
(participation). 
As mentioned above, the one thing that distinguishes retaliation claims un-
der the ADA from claims brought under Title VII is that under the ADA, in ad-
dition to informally complaining about discrimination or harassment, most 
courts hold that requesting an accommodation is protected activity under the 
ADA.26 
One of the first appellate courts to look at this issue was the First Circuit in 
Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc.27 The court stated: 
It is questionable whether Soileau fits within the literal language of the statute: 
he filed no charge, nor participated in any investigation. Moreover, he did not 
literally oppose any act or practice, but simply requested an accommodation, 
which was given. It would seem anomalous, however, to think Congress intend-
ed no retaliation protection for employees who request a reasonable accommo-
dation unless they also file a formal charge. This would leave employees unpro-
tected if an employer granted the accommodation and shortly thereafter 
terminated the employee in retaliation. And so, without addressing the issue any 
further, we will assume arguendo that Soileau’s request brings him within the 
coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).28 
As the Third Circuit explained in Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc.,29 
“The right to request an accommodation in good faith is no less a guarantee un-
der the ADA than the right to file a complaint with the EEOC . . . .”30 
                                                        
24  See, e.g., Senn, supra note 17, at 2039 (stating that protected activity under the “participa-
tion clause encompasses more formal reports, protests, or related conduct, such as actually 
filing ‘charges’ or claims with the [EEOC], or otherwise testifying, assisting, or participating 
in ensuing investigations or proceedings”). 
25  See id. at 2038–39. 
26  See, e.g., Dawson v. Akal Sec. Inc., 660 F. App’x 504, 506 (9th Cir. 2016); Foster v. 
Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (stating that requests for accom-
modation are protected activity); Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (stating same); Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1219 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
requesting an accommodation is protected activity); Tabatchnik v. Cont’l Airlines, 262 F. 
App’x 674, 676 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that requesting an accommodation is protected activ-
ity); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff en-
gaged in protected activity by requesting an accommodation); Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & 
Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Shellenberger v. Summit Ban-
corp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that requesting an accommodation is 
protected activity); Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(stating same); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001). 
27  Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997). 
28  Id. at 16. 
29  Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 183. 
30  Id. at 191. 
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However, not all courts agree that requesting an accommodation should be 
considered protected activity. For instance, in Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pacific 
Railway,31 the court seemed to disagree with the rule that an accommodation 
can be considered protected activity but felt bound to follow precedent.32 The 
court stated: 
One might wonder how the theory behind Kirkeberg’s retaliation claim can be 
squared with the text of the statute. An employee who asserts a right under [the 
ADA] to obtain reasonable accommodation for an alleged disability has not 
“opposed any act or practice made unlawful” by the ADA. Nor has he “testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hear-
ing” under the ADA.33 
But recognizing precedent to the contrary, the court stated: “although ‘[i]t 
is questionable’ whether an employee who merely requests a reasonable ac-
commodation ‘fits within the literal language of the statute,’ we are bound by 
[prior precedent] to conclude that making such a request is protected activi-
ty.”34 Despite this additional method of engaging in protected activity under the 
ADA, there is another, more significant hurdle to plaintiffs being able to estab-
lish that they engaged in protected activity—the reasonable belief rule. 
In a line of cases brought under Title VII, if the employee is claiming op-
position as her protected activity, courts established the “reasonable belief 
rule.”35 This rule requires that the employee establish that she had a good faith, 
reasonable belief that the conduct she was complaining of violated the law.36 
                                                        
31  Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2010). 
32  Id. at 908. 
33  Id. at 907. 
34  Id. at 908 (quoting Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
35  Participation activity receives more absolute protection. If the employee files a charge 
with the EEOC or state-equivalent agency, participates in an EEOC investigation, files a 
complaint in court, or provides testimony in a case, the employee will meet the “protected 
activity” element of the prima facie case even if her belief that she had experienced discrim-
ination was not only incorrect but unreasonably so. See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div., 
170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). 
36  See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
in order for a retaliation claim to be actionable, the opposition must be based on a reasonable 
and good faith belief that the opposed practices were unlawful); Little v. Windermere Relo-
cation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating same); Foster v. Time Warner Entm’t 
Co., 250 F.3d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating same); McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 
241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating same); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care 
Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating same); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincin-
nati, 215 F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that in order for a retaliation claim to be ac-
tionable, the opposition must be based on a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed 
practices were unlawful); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating 
that “a claim concerning the opposition clause requires that the employee have a reasonable 
belief that the practice the employee is opposing violates Title VII”); Drinkwater v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that “a long line of Title VII cases 
hold that a plaintiff establishes a retaliation claim if she shows that she had a reasonable be-
lief that her employer was engaged in an unlawful employment practice and that the employ-
er retaliated against her for protesting against that practice”); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 
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To be clear, the Supreme Court has never affirmatively adopted this rule. In 
Clark County School District v. Breeden,37 the Court had the opportunity to de-
termine if the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII applies only to opposed acts 
that are actually unlawful under Title VII, or whether a plaintiff’s good-faith, 
reasonable belief should suffice.38 The Court recognized that the Court of Ap-
peals below (the Ninth Circuit) had applied the reasonable belief rule but the 
Court stated that it had “no occasion to rule on the propriety of this interpreta-
tion, because even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that 
the incident [the employee complained about] violated Title VII.”39 Despite the 
lack of clarity by the Supreme Court, the reasonable belief rule has prevailed. 
Virtually all courts have adopted this rule in ADA cases. For instance, in 
Hegre v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc.,40 the plaintiff suffered from bipolar disor-
der and a heart condition.41 She requested time off as an accommodation in or-
der to acclimate to new medication.42 Her employer refused, and she was even-
tually terminated.43 Applying pre-Amendments law on the interpretation of the 
definition of disability, the court held that the plaintiff did not have an objec-
tively reasonable belief that her bipolar disorder or her heart condition were 
disabilities.44 Even though the court recognized that her conditions were per-
manent, and even though she was hospitalized twice for her disabilities, the 
court said that because she was able to continue to perform her job functions, 
she did not have a reasonable belief that she was disabled.45 Therefore, she 
could not meet the first element of her retaliation claim. 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Hoover Enterprises, Inc., LLC,46 the plaintiff suf-
fered a stroke that caused difficulty concentrating.47 He was fired shortly after 
he requested an accommodation, but the employer alleged it was because of al-
leged dishonesty as the result of an accounts receivable audit.48 In determining 
whether the plaintiff could prove that he engaged in protected activity, the court 
noted that the plaintiff must have a good faith and reasonable belief that he had 
                                                                                                                                
Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019–20 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (agreeing with the standard that a plaintiff 
claiming retaliation need only have a reasonable and good faith belief that the underlying 
conduct violated Title VII). 
37  Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
38  Id. at 270. 
39  Id. 
40  Hegre v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Ga. 2007). 
41  Id. at 1328. 
42  Id. at 1329, 1331. 
43  Id. at 1331. 
44  Id. at 1335–36. 
45  Id. 
46  Robinson v. Hoover Enters. LLC, No. 1:03-CV-2565-TWT, 2004 WL 2792057, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2004). 
47  Id. at *1. 
48  Id. 
19 NEV. L.J. 823, PORTER 5/27/2019  5:22 PM 
Spring 2019] DISABLING ADA RETALIATION CLAIMS 831 
a disability.49 In making this determination, the court stated that “[t]he objec-
tive reasonableness of a belief must be assessed in terms of the applicable sub-
stantive law. In doing so, this Court must assume Robinson knows the substan-
tive law.”50 
The court held the following evidence was not good enough to establish 
that the plaintiff had a reasonable belief that he was disabled: (1) medical diag-
nosis of long-term impairment, (2) handicapped parking sticker, (3) certifica-
tion of disability by the Georgia Dept. of Labor Rehabilitation Services, and (4) 
his own testimony that he suffers from many serious symptoms and is limited 
in his ability to perform basic life functions.51 These are just a few of the many 
cases, pre-ADAAA, where courts held that the plaintiff’s ADA retaliation 
claim fails because he did not have a reasonable belief that he had a disability 
when he attempted to engage in protected activity. 
2. Adverse Employment Action 
The second element of the prima facie case is that the plaintiff has to 
demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White52 an-
nounced the standard for determining whether a retaliatory employment action 
is sufficiently severe to qualify as an adverse employment action.53 Although 
this is a Title VII case, courts apply the same standard in ADA cases.54 The 
Court held that in order to meet the standard, the plaintiff has to demonstrate 
that the action “would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee 
. . .”55 The action must be “harmful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”56 
Although this seems like a fairly broad standard, the lower courts have held 
many actions to not be “materially adverse.”57 For instance, lower courts have 
found discipline, reprimands, and negative evaluations to not be materially ad-
verse.58 Changes to an employee’s schedule or work assignments were also 
                                                        
49  Id. at *3. 
50  Id. at *4. 
51  Id. at *5. 
52  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
53  Id. at 57. 
54  Adams v. Anne Arundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 431 (4th Cir. 2015) (relying on 
the “analogous Title VII context”). 
55  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57. 
56  Id. 
57  See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 
2041–42 (2015). 
58  See, e.g., Adams, 789 F.3d at 431 (stating that “reprimands and poor performance evalua-
tions” are insufficient to qualify as adverse actions); Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l 
Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 26 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that two citations for insubordination 
insufficient to constitute adverse action); Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 
663 F.3d 556, 568, 571 (2d Cir. 2011) (deciding that three investigations into plaintiff’s con-
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found not to be materially adverse.59 Courts have held that administrative 
leaves or paid suspensions do not meet the materially adverse standard.60 
Moreover, courts almost uniformly hold that “shunning,” “ostracizing,” and be-
ing harassed does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.61 Even 
an employer threatening termination is not an adverse employment action.62 As 
we will see below, this standard remains a problem in post-ADA retaliation 
claims. 
                                                                                                                                
duct, counseling, and “empty” termination threats were not materially adverse); Bhatti v. 
Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that reprimands not material be-
cause of absence of tangible consequences); Jones v. Res-Care, Inc., 613 F.3d 665, 671 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (determining that corrective action unaccompanied by tangible job consequence 
was not sufficient to constitute materially adverse action); Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 
1191, 1198–99 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding proposed suspensions not carried out, letters of 
counseling and reprimand, and unsatisfactory performance review not materially adverse 
actions); Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006) (placing 
employee on performance improvement plan was not adverse employment action); Powell v. 
Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006) (determining that multiple 
written admonitions that did not result in change in compensation was not adverse employ-
ment action); Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that nega-
tive performance appraisals did not qualify as adverse employment actions). 
59  See, e.g., Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2010) (threatening change to 
employees’ schedule was not materially adverse); Fercello v. Cty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 
1069, 1078–79, 1084 (8th Cir. 2010) (reassigning parking place and a less desirable office 
were not actionable); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(granting of less favorable break times and temporary assignment to post office window duty 
not adverse employment actions); Lucero v. Nettle Creek Sch. Corp., 566 F.3d 720, 729 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that teacher’s reassignment to teach seventh grade rather than high 
school not materially adverse employment); Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 
473, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (determining transfer to another department not materially adverse); 
Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 591 (8th Cir. 2007) (deciding that transfer to another dis-
trict not materially adverse); Jones v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 429 F.3d 276, 281 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (stating that transfer that did not result in reduction in pay or benefits not adverse em-
ployment action). 
60  See, e.g., Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding sus-
pension with pay not an adverse employment action); Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91–93 
(2d Cir. 2006) (determining that placement on administrative leave with pay for almost a 
year not adverse employment action). 
61  See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that being called a “cry baby” and “trouble maker” by supervisor was not adverse 
action); Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that co-worker harassment, including name-calling, physical intimidation, false accusations, 
vandalizing belongings, and verbal threats, not retaliatory); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 
779, 790 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that supervisors yelling at plaintiff and physically isolating 
him from other employees was not sufficient to rise to level of adverse employment action). 
62  Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (determining that 
dealership threat to discharge plaintiff for discrimination complaint against another dealer-
ship not an adverse employment action). 
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3. Causation 
The third hurdle in bringing a successful retaliation claim is that the plain-
tiff must prove causation—i.e., she must prove that her complaint (“protected 
activity”) was the cause of the adverse employment action she suffered.63 Em-
ployers are often savvy enough to hide any retaliatory motive. Moreover, un-
less a plaintiff has been a perfect employee, an employer can easily generate a 
legitimate, non-retaliatory motive for the adverse employment action. Often the 
only evidence plaintiffs have that the adverse employment action was in retalia-
tion for the complaint is the temporal proximity between the two events. Thus, 
if an employee complains about discrimination one day and is terminated the 
next, that is pretty strong evidence that retaliation was at play.64 But most em-
ployers are savvy enough to avoid such a close temporal proximity. And some 
courts hold that even a two or three-month temporal proximity is too long to be 
indicative of a retaliatory motive.65 
II. COURTS CONTINUE TO DISABLE ADA RETALIATION CASES 
When I set out to research this topic, I suspected that the expanded defini-
tion of disability in the ADA Amendments Act would lead to a robust percent-
age of successful ADA retaliation cases. To be clear, this is not a comparison of 
pre- and post-ADAAA retaliation cases. I was unable to find a study that cov-
ered ADA retaliation claims in the pre-ADAAA era.66 Nevertheless, I did set 
out to determine whether the expanded definition of disability in the ADAAA 
would lead to successful ADA retaliation claims. This Part will explain my 
methodology, describe my results using examples where courts found against 
plaintiffs in ADA retaliation claims, and illustrate what a successful ADA retal-
iation case looks like. 
A. Methodology 
For this article, I researched all of the ADA retaliation cases brought after 
the ADA was amended. Specifically, I used this search—“retaliation /s 
ADA”—in the Westlaw “all federal cases” database. I attempted to narrow the 
search in a couple of ways. Specifically, I only wanted “reported” cases. I am 
                                                        
63  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (requiring but-for causa-
tion in retaliation cases under Title VII). 
64  See, e.g., Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 2016) (ex-
plaining that termination two days after protected expression was sufficiently suspicious, 
unless other evidence showed that plaintiff would have been terminated anyway). 
65  See, e.g., Sherris v. City Colls. of Chicago, No. 15 C 9078, 2018 WL 999902, at *8–*10 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2018) (holding that even a seven-week time gap between plaintiff’s initial 
report of harassment and termination was too long to support a finding of retaliation). 
66  There are studies discussing the abysmal success rates of ADA disability discrimination 
cases, but not ADA retaliation cases. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: 
THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 96–125 (2005) (discussing the 
federal courts’ backlash against the ADA). 
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well aware that many important cases can get buried in unpublished opinions 
but focusing on reported cases allowed me to keep the dataset within managea-
ble bounds.67 I also limited it by date, searching only for cases after January 1, 
2009. This is the date that the ADA Amendments Act became effective.68 The 
reason I chose that date was because I wanted to see if the broadened definition 
of “disability” after the Amendments would affect the substantive claim of 
ADA retaliation. Most of my recent research has focused on what is happening 
in the law since the ADA was amended. Even though a plaintiff does not have 
to be disabled in order to bring a retaliation claim,69 many plaintiffs bring an 
anti-discrimination claim or a failure-to-accommodate claim along with a retal-
iation claim, so one might expect more substantive claims to be successful after 
the ADA Amendments. 
Finally, I attempted to limit the dataset by clicking on the “topic” button of 
“Employment & Labor,” although that was not foolproof, as I ended up finding 
118 cases that were not employment cases. The search resulted in 1,191 cases 
as of the date that I finished my review of all of them, which was November 10, 
2017. Any cases decided or published to Westlaw’s website after that date will 
not be included in this article’s dataset. 
I excluded many cases from this initial set of 1,191 cases. First, even 
though I set the beginning date for my search as January 1, 2009, many cases 
were excluded because they were pre-ADAAA cases. This happened because 
the ADA Amendments Act was not retroactive,70 so there were many cases that 
were decided after January 1, 2009, but the facts of the case that led to liability 
occurred prior to that date. In total, there were 312 cases of the initial 1,191 
where the facts occurred prior to the date the ADA Amendments became effec-
tive.71 
Second, as mentioned above, I excluded 118 cases that were not employ-
ment cases, even when they made it through my attempt to filter them out by 
checking the “Employment & Labor” button on the Westlaw search. 
Third, I also excluded 37 cases where the plaintiff only survived a motion 
to dismiss (rather than surviving a motion for summary judgment). My ra-
tionale for this exclusion was that surviving a motion to dismiss is not a big 
                                                        
67  I also did not think that reported cases and unreported cases would lead to significantly 
different results. However, some studies have found that reported opinions overstate plain-
tiff’s win rates. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 910 (2006). 
68  Befort, supra note 3, at 2029. 
69  See, e.g., Anderson v. Nat’l Grid, PLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 120, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting 
that even if a plaintiff is not disabled, they are still protected under the ADA’s anti-
retaliation provision). 
70  See, e.g., Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (not apply-
ing the ADAAA where the conduct occurred prior to the amendments); EEOC v. Argo Dis-
trib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting ADAAA does not apply retroactively). 
71  List of cases on file with the author. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. 
Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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feat. Such a motion is decided based on only the pleadings and before there has 
been any discovery; many plaintiffs who survive a motion to dismiss may nev-
ertheless lose on a motion for summary judgment. I did, however, include cases 
where the plaintiff did not survive a motion to dismiss for the same reason. If a 
plaintiff cannot even survive a motion to dismiss, this is significant evidence 
that either the claim was really meritless or the courts are using rules and stand-
ards in such a way that limits the number of successful cases. 
Fourth, I excluded 46 cases where the ADA retaliation issue was not fully 
fleshed out because the courts only addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff 
adequately exhausted her remedies under the ADA. Under the ADA, plaintiffs 
have to exhaust their remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC before they 
can file a lawsuit in federal court.72 Sometimes, plaintiffs file a charge that does 
not specifically mention ADA retaliation; in these cases, the courts have to de-
cide whether the facts mentioned in the EEOC charge adequately put the de-
fendant-employer on notice that the plaintiff planned to pursue an ADA retalia-
tion claim.73 For cases in this category, the courts only discussed whether or not 
the plaintiffs adequately exhausted their remedies and did not include a discus-
sion of the merits of the ADA retaliation claim.74 
Similarly, I excluded a whopping 294 cases that did not include a discus-
sion of an ADA retaliation claim. This was somewhat surprising given that my 
search terms included “retaliation /s ADA.” Some of these cases only discussed 
state-law claims and were referencing the ADA as a comparison point.75 Some 
are excluded because they simply mention the ADA’s retaliation provisions but 
do not discuss them.76 
I also excluded 114 cases that discussed procedural issues unrelated to a 
dispositive motion. For instance, many cases discussed a state employer’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.77 Others discussed discovery issues.78 
                                                        
72  42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012); see also, e.g., Gomez v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 191 F. Supp. 
3d 293, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
73  Gomez, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 299 (“[C]laims not raised in an EEOC complaint . . . may be 
brought in federal court if they are ‘reasonably related’ to the claim filed with the agency. A 
claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the 
scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the 
charge that was made.”) (citation omitted). 
74  Id. at 300 (holding that plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim was not reasonably related to her 
EEOC charge). 
75  See, e.g., Soto v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 197 F. Supp. 3d 930, 932 
(S.D. Tex. 2016) (discussing the plaintiff’s claim under a Texas anti-retaliation statute). 
76  See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (holding that, 
for Title VII retaliation claims, plaintiffs must prove that retaliation was the but-for cause of 
the adverse employment action); Id. at 377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing ADA retal-
iation simply to point out that, under the ADA, Congress included ADA retaliation in a sepa-
rate provision from the status-based discrimination). 
77  See, e.g., Levy v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 789 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 
2015) (discussing employer’s 11th Amendment immunity argument). 
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Finally, I excluded eight cases that only discussed damages issues or attor-
ney’s fees.79 These cases, along with all of the other excluded cases, were ex-
cluded because they did not engage in a discussion of a post-Amendments 
ADA retaliation claim. 
B. The Results 
After all of the exclusions, I was left with 262 cases. Of those, in 196 or 
almost 75% of them, the plaintiff lost, and the employer’s dispositive motion 
was granted. Plaintiffs only won in 66 or just over 25% of the cases. And by 
“won” I mean that the plaintiff only survived a motion for summary judgment. 
As most employment lawyers know, surviving a motion for summary judgment 
is good news for an employment discrimination plaintiff, because it drastically 
increases the settlement potential and value as most employers prefer to avoid 
the expenses of a trial.80 But certainly, surviving a motion for summary judg-
ment cannot be said to be the equivalent of a plaintiff “win,” whereas the grant 
of a defendant’s summary judgment motion is very much a win for the employ-
er and an unmitigated loss for the plaintiff. Given this reality, employers win-
ning these dispositive motions in more than 75% is a shockingly high number. 
To put this number in perspective, in Professor Befort’s post-ADAAA em-
pirical study, in ADA discrimination claims (as opposed to retaliation claims 
that I am studying), plaintiffs in his post-Amendments dataset had a success 
rate of 40% (out of a much smaller dataset than mine here).81 In another study 
of plaintiff win rates of all discrimination and retaliation claims, plaintiffs were 
successful in 32.2% of retaliation claims (under all anti-discrimination stat-
utes).82 
The next question is: why? What is causing plaintiffs to lose so many post-
Amendments ADA retaliation cases? The answer can be explained partly by 
referring to the three elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. In other 
words, courts are using the rules described above—the reasonable belief rule, 
the adverse employment action requirement, and the rule regarding close tem-
poral proximity—to dismiss plaintiffs’ ADA retaliation claims. But courts are 
also interpreting the facts of the case in a way that allows the courts to hold that 
the plaintiff cannot prove that the employer’s asserted reason for its adverse 
employment action was pretextual. I will explore all of these in turn. 
                                                                                                                                
78  See, e.g., Kronenberg v. Baker & McKenzie LLP, 747 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (discussing motion to compel discovery). 
79  See, e.g., Watson v. Cty. of Yavapai, 240 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1001 (D. Ariz. 2017) (discuss-
ing attorney fees). 
80  See, e.g., Befort, supra note 3, at 2067 (stating that most ADA plaintiffs who survive 
summary judgment are able to negotiate some type of positive settlement). 
81  Id. at 2069. 
82  Parker, supra note 67, at 944; see infra Appendix A. 
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1. Continued Use of the Reasonable Belief Rule 
As discussed above, before the ADA was amended to dramatically expand 
the definition of disability, many courts held that a plaintiff’s retaliation claim 
failed because she did not have a reasonable belief that she was disabled. Natu-
rally, because the definition of disability is so much broader after the Amend-
ments, we would expect to see fewer courts dismissing plaintiffs’ claims based 
on the argument that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable belief that they 
were disabled. That is mostly true. But there are still a couple of cases where 
the court held that the plaintiff could not establish that she had a reasonable be-
lief that she was disabled under the ADA. One was Isley v. Aker Philadelphia 
Shipyard, Inc.,83 where the plaintiff suffered an injury to his finger at work and 
asked for a temporary light duty assignment as an accommodation, and the em-
ployer refused.84 He was eventually terminated, and in analyzing his retaliation 
claim, the court stated that there was no protected activity. Even though a re-
quest for an accommodation could be protected activity, in this case, he did not 
have a reasonable belief that his temporary finger impairment was a disability 
so requesting light duty as an accommodation does not qualify as protected ac-
tivity.85 
Even though there are not as many cases post-ADAAA where courts use 
the reasonable belief rule with regard to the definition of disability, courts con-
tinue to use the reasonable belief rule regarding other allegations in the plain-
tiff’s ADA retaliation claim. For instance, in Jenkins v. Medical Laboratories 
of Eastern Iowa, Inc.,86 the plaintiff was harassed by coworkers after she in-
jured herself at work and filed a worker’s compensation claim.87 After her back 
injury, she had to use a stool at work and could only work while sitting.88 This 
caused her coworkers to sometimes have to pick up the slack for her, which led 
to them harassing her.89 They would not speak to her for hours, would ignore 
her work-related questions, snap at her, slam doors in her face, and act like she 
wasn’t there.90 She was eventually fired after she complained about the harass-
ment.91 With regard to the first element of her prima facie case, that she en-
gaged in protected activity when she complained about the harassment, the 
plaintiff argued that she had a reasonable belief that she was complaining about 
harassment that violated the ADA, because she experienced daily harassment 
                                                        
83  Isley v. Aker Phila. Shipyard, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 466 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
84  Id. at 468–69. 
85  Id. at 470. 
86  Jenkins v. Med. Labs. of E. Iowa, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Iowa 2012). 
87  Id. at 953. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 955 (stating employer terminated plaintiff after she refused to meet with an Em-
ployee Assistance Plan representative to work on her interpersonal skills). 
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by her coworkers.92 But the court held that, in light of substantive law where 
courts have taken a restrictive approach to harassment claims, a reasonable per-
son would not have found that giving her the silent treatment, acting annoyed 
by her, failing to answer her questions, and slamming doors was anything more 
than rude, abrasive, unkind, or insensitive conduct.93 Therefore, the court held 
that the plaintiff did not prove that she had engaged in protected activity be-
cause the plaintiff’s belief that the harassment violated the ADA was unreason-
able.94 
This issue also arose in Kimbrough v. Cincinnati Association for the Blind 
& Visually Impaired,95 where the plaintiff was advocating on behalf of one of 
her subordinate employees, who took leave of absence for a heart surgery, and 
wanted to return.96 The plaintiff became upset that the employer was consider-
ing terminating the employee who was on leave and that the employer was as-
serting that the heart condition was not a disability.97 When the plaintiff contin-
ued to advocate on behalf of the other employee, the plaintiff was terminated 
for insubordination.98 The plaintiff alleged that her protected activity was op-
posing the employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process with the em-
ployee on leave.99 The court, however, held that the plaintiff did not have a rea-
sonable belief that the employer was violating the law with respect to the 
employee with the heart condition.100 
In another case involving advocating on behalf of someone else, the court 
in Tyson v. Access Services101 held that the plaintiff, who was advocating on 
behalf of her disabled clients, had not engaged in protected activity because the 
plaintiff could not have reasonably believed her disagreements with her em-
ployer about the level of care being provided to some disabled clients was a vi-
olation of the ADA.102 
Sometimes the courts did not even consider the reasonable belief rule but 
simply held that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity because she 
did not oppose behavior that was actually unlawful under the ADA. In Lukic v. 
Eisai Corporation of North America, Inc.,103 the plaintiff took Family and Med-
ical Leave Act (FMLA) leave to be with her baby, who had Down’s syn-
                                                        
92  Id. at 964. 
93  Id. at 964–65. 
94  Id. at 965. 
95  Kimbrough v. Cincinnati Ass’n for the Blind & Visually Impaired, 986 F. Supp. 2d 904 
(S.D. Ohio 2013). 
96  Id. at 909. 
97  Id. at 912. 
98  Id. at 914. 
99  Id. at 917. 
100  Id. 
101  Tyson v. Access Servs., 158 F. Supp. 3d 309, 311 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
102  Id. at 316. 
103  Lukic v. Eisai Corp. of N. Am. Inc., 919 F. Supp. 2d 936 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). 
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drome.104 When she was later terminated and alleged that the employer retaliat-
ed against her for taking leave to care for her disabled daughter, the court held 
that there was no protected activity because she was not complaining about be-
havior that was actually unlawful under the ADA—employers are not required 
to accommodate an employee’s need to care for a disabled family member.105 
The court is correct that the ADA’s association provision does not require em-
ployers to give employees a reasonable accommodation to care for a disabled 
loved one,106 but the court never considered whether the plaintiff had a reason-
able belief that the employer had violated the ADA. Thus, her retaliation claim 
failed.107 
Similarly, the court in Morissette v. Cote Corp.108 held that the plaintiff 
failed to meet the protected activity prong of the prima facie case, stating that a 
jury could not reasonably conclude that the employer’s requirement that the 
plaintiff, who was a heavy equipment mechanic, be able to pass a Department 
of Transportation medical exam was discriminatory.109 Therefore, his opposi-
tion to that requirement was not protected activity.110 Again, the court neglect-
ed to even consider the reasonable belief rule. 
The court also failed to consider the reasonable belief rule in Scruggs v. 
Pulaski County.111 The plaintiff in this case worked as a juvenile detention of-
ficer and suffered from fibromyalgia, degenerative discrimination, and cervical 
disease.112 Because the employer claimed it could not accommodate her lifting 
restriction, it put her on leave.113 Before the leave expired, the plaintiff request-
ed an additional week of unpaid leave to allow her to obtain a certification from 
her doctor that would have lifted her restrictions.114 Because the employer did 
not think the additional leave would allow her to work without restrictions, it 
terminated her.115 The court held (incorrectly, in my mind) that a request for an 
additional week of leave beyond the twelve weeks required under the FMLA 
was not a reasonable accommodation.116 Thus, in analyzing her retaliation 
                                                        
104  Id. at 938. 
105  Id. at 945. 
106  See, e.g., Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1091–92 (10th Cir. 1997). 
107  Lukic, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 946. 
108  Morissette v. Cote Corp., 190 F. Supp. 3d 193 (D. Me. 2016). 
109  Id. at 211–12. 
110  Id. at 211. 
111  See Scruggs v. Pulaski Cty., 817 F.3d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 2016). 
112  Id. at 1091. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 1093. The court is wrong about this because additional leave beyond what is re-
quired by the FMLA is often considered a reasonable accommodation, as long as the request 
is not for indefinite leave. Compare Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 
1135–36 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing leave if it’s for a set period of time), with Wood v. Green, 
323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that indefinite leave is not a reasonable ac-
commodation), and Thomas v. Trane, No. 5:05-CV-440(CAR), 2007 WL 2874776, at *7 
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claim, the court held that requesting additional leave could not be protected ac-
tivity because she was not requesting a reasonable accommodation.117 Even if 
the court was correct that additional leave was not a reasonable accommoda-
tion, it should have considered whether she had a reasonable belief that asking 
for additional leave was a reasonable accommodation. 
Other cases failed on the protected activity prong because the court held 
that the plaintiff never requested an accommodation, and there was no other 
protected activity, such as an EEOC charge. For instance, in Preddie v. Bar-
tholomew Consolidated School Corp.,118 the plaintiff was a fifth-grade teacher, 
who was diabetic and had a son who suffered from sickle cell anemia.119 His 
boss complained to him about his son’s illnesses causing him to miss work in 
part because the plaintiff had been absent quite a bit for his own disability.120 
The plaintiff missed two days because of diabetes, and six days because of 
acute hypertension and kidney failure.121 Despite his repeated absences that 
certainly would have qualified for FMLA leave, the plaintiff never formally 
applied for leave under the FMLA.122 The court held that his retaliation claim 
must fail because he never requested a reasonable accommodation.123 Even 
though he requested leave for his own disability several times, the court stated 
that these requests did not actually constitute requests for accommodations un-
der the ADA and were therefore not protected activity.124 
2. Misapplication of the “Materially Adverse” Standard 
As discussed above, the relevant standard for determining whether there is 
an adverse employment action sufficient to meet the second element of a retali-
ation claim was announced in the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White.125 The Court held that in order to meet 
the standard, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the action “would have been 
materially adverse to a reasonable employee . . .”126 The action must be “harm-
                                                                                                                                
(M.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2007) (holding same). See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP 
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ac 
commodation.html [https://perma.cc/M88E-CDNG] (stating that, even if an employee has 
exhausted all leave under the FMLA, the employer has to provide additional leave under the 
ADA unless doing so would cause an undue hardship). 
117  Scruggs, 817 F.3d at 1094. 
118  Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2015). 
119  Id. at 808. 
120  Id. at 810. 
121  Id. at 811. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 814. 
124  Id. at 815. 
125  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
126  Id. at 54. 
19 NEV. L.J. 823, PORTER 5/27/2019  5:22 PM 
Spring 2019] DISABLING ADA RETALIATION CLAIMS 841 
ful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making 
or supporting a charge of discrimination.”127 
This seems straightforward enough, and the Court even clarified that de-
spite this being an objective standard, “[c]ontext matters.”128 However, in many 
ADA retaliation cases, actions that might objectively seem like adverse em-
ployment actions were held not to be.129 
For instance, in Buie v. Berrien, the plaintiff had lung disease and asthma 
and had trouble with the air quality issues at her workplace.130 She requested a 
private office or the ability to telework and both were initially denied, although 
eventually they transferred her back to a location she had worked at previously 
that had a private office for her.131 Throughout this process, her boss yelled at 
her, walked away from her, and slammed doors in her face.132 The court held 
that this behavior did not amount to an adverse employment action, because it 
was not “tangible.”133 Similarly, the court held that the delay in granting her an 
accommodation was also not an adverse employment action.134 Other courts 
have similarly held that being yelled at by a supervisor is not an adverse em-
ployment action.135 
In Hargrove v. AARP,136 the court held that negative performance reviews 
and increasingly harsh working conditions that did not abide by the plaintiff’s 
doctor’s restrictions were not adverse employment actions.137 Similar to other 
cases, the court also held that the “denial of a request for accommodation does 
not by itself support a claim of retaliation based on the request. If it did, then 
every failure-to-accommodate claim would be doubled.”138 
In another questionable case, the plaintiff had Attention Deficit Disorder 
(ADD) and requested a quiet work space as an accommodation, which was giv-
en in part because a coworker agreed to swap offices.139 Later on, the employer 
moved the plaintiff to another building and her supervisor assigned her to a 
                                                        
127  Id. at 57. 
128  Id. at 69. 
129  For a list of all cases holding that there was no adverse employment action, see infra Ap-
pendix A. 
130  Buie v. Berrien, 85 F. Supp. 3d 161, 166 (D.D.C. 2015). 
131  Id. at 167–68. 
132  Id. at 167. 
133  Id. at 177–78. 
134  Id. at 178. 
135  See, e.g., Alderson v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 937, 956 (N.D. Ind. 2015) (stating 
that being yelled at by supervisor is not materially adverse; the plaintiff was not a reasonable 
worker; she was an “extremely sensitive” worker); Lewis v. Erie Cty. Med. Ctr. Corp., 907 
F. Supp. 2d 336, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that the plaintiff being chastised, berated, 
chased down the hall, criticized, given negative performance evaluations, and denied sched-
ule changes are not adverse employment actions). 
136  Hargrove v. AARP, 205 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2016). 
137  Id. at 115. 
138  Id. at 116. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
139  Aldrich v. Burwell, 197 F. Supp. 3d 124, 128 (D.D.C. 2016). 
19 NEV. L.J. 823, PORTER 5/27/2019  5:22 PM 
842 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
loud cubicle right by the supervisor’s office, so the supervisor could closely 
monitor the plaintiff.140 Shortly after plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Op-
portunity complaint, for which the supervisor acknowledged receipt, the super-
visor gave her a “leave restriction,” which required the plaintiff to announce 
her whereabouts to her supervisor any time she would be away from her desk 
for fifteen minutes or more.141 A few months later, the plaintiff was suspended 
for ten days for failing to adhere to the leave policy on a day when a blizzard 
was underway in Washington D.C.142 
In analyzing whether this increased scrutiny or monitoring was an adverse 
employment action, the court first noted that courts have been almost unani-
mous in holding that monitoring or tracking of an employee’s whereabouts 
does not rise to the level of a materially adverse action.143 Instead, the court 
recognized this as a “basic employment practice” and said it can only be an ad-
verse employment action if the plaintiff previously had immunity from moni-
toring policies.144 The court seemed to recognize that there might be an excep-
tion if the employer’s monitoring is not applied consistently145 (which it 
arguably was not in this case) but then stated that selective enforcement does 
not alone convert enforcement of a policy into an adverse employment action—
it’s still just a petty slight.146 Even though the plaintiff found it condescending 
or even infantilizing, the court stated that “her personal response cannot trans-
form an otherwise ‘minor annoyance’ into ‘an action that would have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination.’ ”147 
3. Causation 
Generally speaking, unless there is a smoking gun regarding a decision-
maker’s retaliatory motive, most plaintiffs prove causation through suspicious 
timing, a close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the ad-
verse employment action.148 But many, many courts in the cases I researched 
held that temporal proximity alone is not enough to establish causation, even at 
the prima facie case stage.149 
                                                        
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 129. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 132. 
144  Id. at 133. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. at 134. 
147  Id. at 134–35 (citation omitted) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 68 (2006)) (then quoting Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 
2008)). 
148  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 49, 56 (2018) [hereinafter Porter, Ending Harassment]. 
149  For a list of these cases, see infra Appendix B. 
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For instance, in Kieffer v. CPR Restoration & Cleaning Service, LLC,150 
the plaintiff had several disabilities that required him to request several leaves 
of absence over his career.151 His bosses made statements about his medical 
conditions interfering with his work.152 After a work-related injury and a work-
er’s compensation claim, he was terminated, with his boss stating: “[W]e have 
enough trouble feeding the ones we have, and things have gotten weird, so I 
thought long and hard, and this is just the best decision I think.”153 When dis-
cussing his prima facie case of retaliation, the court noted that he satisfied the 
first two elements—his requests for reasonable accommodations for his disabil-
ities were his protected activity, and he suffered an adverse employment action 
when he was terminated.154 But then the court stated that unless the temporal 
proximity is unusually suggestive of retaliatory animus, timing alone will not 
satisfy the causation element.155 The court stated that here, the two-month lapse 
between his protected activity and termination was too long.156 The court also 
noted that the statements about his supervisors being upset about his leaves of 
absence is not enough to establish causation; instead, they are merely inquiries 
about his ability to comply with the employer’s workplace rules.157 
Similarly, in Perez v. Transformer Manufacturers, Inc.,158 the plaintiff 
worked a physically arduous job and eventually injured himself at work, lead-
ing to restrictions that prohibited him from doing the main function of his job, 
so he was placed on light duty pursuant to his worker’s compensation claim.159 
His supervisor told him that if he was too old or too injured to do the job, “the 
door is over there.”160 After his worker’s compensation claim was denied, his 
boss said he shouldn’t work there because he was “old, useless, and only get-
ting in the way,” and that he couldn’t return until he was “100% recovered.”161 
He filed a charge of discrimination on October 13, 2009, claiming he had been 
terminated, although he did continue to receive short-term disability benefits 
until January 15, 2010.162 Once the benefits expired, he was terminated on Jan-
uary 25, 2010.163 The only issue for the court was causation.164 The plaintiff be-
                                                        
150  Kieffer v. CPR Restoration & Cleaning Serv., LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Pa. 
2016). 
151  Id. at 526. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 527. 
154  Id. at 536. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Perez v. Transformer Mfrs., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
159  Id. at 945. 
160  Id. at 946. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. at 947. 
164  Id. at 954. 
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lieved his termination in January 2010 was retaliation for filing the EEOC 
charge in October 2009.165 The court, however, stated that three months is too 
long to be evidence of causation.166 The court did not believe that the com-
ments by his boss that he was “useless” and getting in the way demonstrated 
retaliatory intent.167 Instead, the court stated that those comments were isolated 
and did not demonstrate that the employer was motivated by retaliation.168 
The plaintiff also couldn’t prove causation in Reyes v. Krasdale Foods, Inc. 
Even though there was only one month between the plaintiff’s filing of an 
EEOC charge and his adverse employment action (constructive discharge), be-
cause the employer acted the same way by refusing his accommodation re-
quests both before and after the protected activity, he couldn’t establish causa-
tion.169 Despite the fact that the plaintiff’s boss became hostile and agitated 
when he requested a schedule change to better manage his diabetes, the court 
held that there was no causation.170 
In Robinson v. Rocktenn, CP, LLC,171 the plaintiff was a utility employee 
who had knee problems, leading to knee surgery.172 The surgery took place in 
December 2009 and she returned to work in June 2010.173 In August 2010, the 
plaintiff requested an accommodation, specifically, that she be allowed to work 
on an automatic machine because the manual machine hurt her knee and her 
back.174 The employer denied her the accommodation, and shortly thereafter (in 
October 2010), the employer suspended her twice.175 She did not believe the 
suspensions were warranted so she filed a grievance.176 The employer fired her 
on October 19, 2010.177 When discussing her retaliation claim, the court stated 
that her protected activity was a charge filed in October 2009,178 although that 
charge is not mentioned in the facts of the case. The court ignored the griev-
ance she filed in October 2010 as a possible protected activity, and then stated 
that the one-year time gap between her October 2009 charge and her October 
2010 termination was too long.179 I don’t necessarily disagree that in an ordi-
nary case, one year would be long, but in addition to ignoring the grievance as 
protected activity, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she was 
                                                        
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169  Reyes v. Krasdale Foods, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 486, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
170  Id. at 489, 494. 
171  Robinson v. Rocktenn, CP, LLC, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
172  Id. at 1296–97. 
173  Id. at 1297. 
174  Id. at 1298. 
175  Id. at 1299. 
176  Id. at 1300. 
177  Id. at 1311. 
178  Id. 
179  See id. 
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on leave from November 2009 to June 2010, during which the employer did not 
have an opportunity to retaliate against her.180 
In another case where the plaintiff lost because she was not able to prove 
causation, the plaintiff was a contracts specialist who was diagnosed with mul-
tiple sclerosis (MS) after she was hired.181 She started having difficulty with 
attendance and punctuality because of the MS diagnosis and excessive fatigue 
caused by the MS, and she requested several accommodations, including 
FMLA leave.182 She also requested a work-from-home accommodation, which 
the employer denied, and shortly thereafter, she was terminated, allegedly for 
her tardiness.183 The court recognized that she was able to meet the first two 
elements of the prima facie case—her protected activity was requesting ac-
commodations and the adverse employment action was, of course, the termina-
tion.184 She argued that causation was demonstrated by the short time between 
her accommodation requests and her termination, as well as the fact that they 
started disciplining her for tardiness after she requested an accommodation, 
when she had been allowed to arrive late in the past (before she had begun re-
questing accommodations) without any consequence.185 The court disagreed, 
stating that timing alone is not enough.186 The court also held that emails indi-
cating that the employer was frustrated about her FMLA leaves were also not 
evidence of retaliatory motive, so she could not prove causation.187 
Finally, in Adams v. Persona, Inc.,188 after the plaintiff admitted his de-
pendency on alcohol, the employer told him that if he entered treatment, they 
would allow him ten weeks of leave.189 After he completed the treatment, the 
employer terminated him.190 Although the court cited the correct rule that a re-
quest for an accommodation is protected activity for an ADA retaliation claim, 
it debated whether the plaintiff had actually requested an accommodation.191 
Ultimately, though, the court held that because a request for leave to attend re-
habilitation for alcohol dependency qualifies for ADA protection as a request 
for an accommodation, the plaintiff’s admission to alcohol dependency could 
be construed as his request for accommodation.192 
                                                        
180  Id. at 1312 n.24. 
181  Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 2014). 
182  Id. at 484. 
183  Id. at 487. 
184  Id. at 494–95. 
185  Id. at 495. 
186  Id. at 496. 
187  Id. 
188  Adams v. Persona, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 973 (D.S.D. 2015). 
189  Id. at 977. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 979. 
192  Id. at 981. Because the plaintiff was terminated, the court easily found the second ele-
ment of the claim—that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action—was met. Id. at 
982. 
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With regard to causation, the court cited the now-familiar rule that tem-
poral proximity alone cannot establish causation at the prima facie stage unless 
the timing is “very close,” which the court interpreted to mean less than one 
month.193 Because Adams was terminated two months after he admitted to al-
coholism and the employer offered him leave to enter treatment, the court stat-
ed that the two months, “alone, cannot establish causation.”194 It also cited an 
Eighth Circuit case as stating that “even two weeks is ‘barely’ sufficient for es-
tablishing causation.”195 
4. Pretext 
Even when a plaintiff can prove the prima facie case of retaliation, the em-
ployer then has the opportunity to assert a legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for the adverse employment action.196 This is a very easy burden; therefore, 
most cases will proceed to the final step in this burden-shifting framework—
whether the employee can prove that the employer’s reason was pretextual. 
Quite frequently, the courts in ADA retaliation cases hold that the plaintiff can-
not prove pretext.197 Many of these cases are fact sensitive, and undoubtedly, 
many of them are correctly decided. But because a motion for summary judg-
ment requires the court to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party (almost always the plaintiff), some of the cases courts dis-
missed, claiming lack of pretext, were troubling. 
For instance, in Johnson v. District of Columbia,198 the plaintiff was a pub-
lic-school teacher who had severe back problems, which led to medical leave 
and a request for an aide to help her with lifting, etc.199 She eventually injured 
herself at work, although the worker’s compensation claim was denied.200 She 
requested additional leave, which was at first granted.201 However, at some 
point she was ordered to return to work, but she believed that she was not phys-
ically able to return.202 More specifically, she told her employer that she was 
suffering from severe depression, so she asked for an extension of leave.203 In a 
November 16 letter, the employer told the plaintiff that it would evaluate her 
latest request for a leave extension as long as she submitted a bunch of paper-
                                                        
193  Id. at 982. 
194  Id. at 983. 
195  Id. (citing Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
196  Booth v. Houston, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
197  See infra Appendix C (listing 60 cases that failed because the court held that the plaintiff 
could not prove pretext). 
198  Johnson v. District of Columbia, 207 F. Supp. 3d 3 (D.D.C. 2016). 
199  Id. at 7–8. 
200  Id. at 9. 
201  See id. at 8. 
202  Id. at 9. 
203  Id. at 10. 
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work, including a questionnaire filled out by her doctor, by November 23.204 
Plaintiff objected to the one-week turnaround, claiming that it would take long-
er than that for her medical provider to get to the paperwork, especially given 
that the deadline was the day after Thanksgiving that year.205 Despite the plain-
tiff’s attempts, her doctor did not submit the paperwork until November 30, and 
the employer fired the plaintiff in the interim for failing to meet its strict dead-
line.206 
The court did not discuss her prima facie case, and instead jumped right in-
to the plaintiff’s pretext argument.207 The court stated that the employer’s deci-
sion to terminate her for failing to meet a deadline for submitting medical pa-
perwork (something which was out of her control) was a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for her termination and she had not proven pretext.208 
The court also stated that the temporal proximity between her request for the 
accommodation (additional medical leave) and her termination was not enough 
to prove pretext.209 And even though the deadline and subsequent decision by 
the employer to terminate her was unfair, it was not retaliatory.210 
In another case, after the plaintiff started taking medication for anxiety, 
which caused him to behave bizarrely, he took a leave of absence and was 
eventually medically cleared for work.211 Shortly thereafter, in May 2014, the 
plaintiff was asked to investigate a complaint.212 Management became unhappy 
about how the plaintiff handled the complaint, so the CEO met with the plain-
tiff to tell him that his job was going to be reworked to remove any manage-
ment duties.213 The employer changed the plaintiff’s job duties, and his salary 
was reduced by $50,000.214 Eventually, this led the plaintiff to file a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC in March 2015.215 In August 2015, there was a 
business downturn and plaintiff was informed that the employer would need to 
lay off employees.216 Plaintiff was one of those employees who would be laid 
off unless he could put together a successful business plan that would bring in 
some new business.217 During this time, the CEO commented to him that “life 
would be easier [without] this distraction,” referring to the plaintiff’s EEOC 
                                                        
204  Id. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. 
207  See id. at 11. 
208  Id. at 12. 
209  Id. at 13. 
210  Id. 
211  Ullrich v. Cexec, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 3d 515, 520, 531 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
212  Id. at 520. 
213  Id. at 521. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at 522. 
216  Id. at 522–23. 
217  Id. at 523. 
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charge.218 Despite this statement, the court held that it was not enough to estab-
lish causation or pretext.219 
5. Not Fully Argued 
Finally, some cases are lost simply because the plaintiff’s lawyer does not 
argue the case properly. For instance, in one case, even though the plaintiff had 
requested an accommodation, which is protected activity, and was shortly 
thereafter terminated, which should have met both the elements of the adverse 
employment action, and causation, the court stated that the plaintiff did not ar-
gue the elements of her prima facie case.220 Instead, the plaintiff had simply ar-
gued that the employer did not have valid reasons for terminating her, and the 
court held that this is simply a legal assertion and dismissed her claim.221 
C. Some Plaintiffs Survive 
Certainly, there were plenty of meritorious claims in my dataset, sixty-six 
to be exact. Some had very strong facts. But others were cases that I imagined 
other courts would have dismissed. In other words, some of the cases survived 
because the court took seriously its obligation to construe all factual disputes in 
favor of the plaintiff, the non-moving party. 
1. Cases with Really Strong Facts 
I found several cases where the plaintiff had very strong facts to support 
her ADA retaliation claim. For instance, in Norris v. GKN Westland Aerospace, 
Inc.,222 the plaintiff worked in a manufacturing facility, when he was diagnosed 
with Type II diabetes and high blood pressure, which caused other ailments, 
making it difficult for him to stand for long periods of time, and requiring him 
to monitor his blood sugar level several times a day and follow a nutrition 
plan.223 Several supervisors were relentless about teasing him and criticizing 
him for his necessary accommodations.224 For example, one supervisor criti-
cized him for taking too many breaks to manage his diabetes.225 Another super-
visor would follow him to the restroom and break room and would confront 
him about the breaks for his diabetes.226 Plaintiff complained about this har-
assment and less than two weeks later, he was transferred to the third shift, 
which disrupted his schedule and made it more difficult for him to manage his 
                                                        
218  Id. at 524. 
219  Id. at 533–34. 
220  Torres v. House of Rep. of P.R., 858 F. Supp. 2d 172, 181–82, 190 (D.P.R. 2012). 
221  Id. at 190. 
222  Norris v. GKN Westland Aerospace, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Ala. 2013). 
223  Id. at 1311. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
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diabetes.227 The supervisor on that shift taunted him as well and another super-
visor would yell at him for being in the break room too much.228 Eventually, 
they suspended him and then terminated him, allegedly for poor quality work-
manship.229 The court sensibly held that there was enough evidence of a retalia-
tory motive—that his complaints about the harassment caused the adverse em-
ployment actions.230 
Similarly, in Cloe v. City of Indianapolis,231 the plaintiff was diagnosed 
with multiple sclerosis (MS) shortly after she began working.232 After her diag-
nosis, her supervisor expressed anger about her having to take off work for a 
doctor’s appointment, and one week later, terminated her for alleged conduct 
that occurred three or four weeks earlier.233 The court noted that the misconduct 
they allegedly terminated her for was fishy and also noted that the supervisor’s 
expression of anger about her leaving early for a doctor’s appointment and 
many other negative comments about her MS were evidence of a retaliatory 
motive.234 Thus, the plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim survived.235 
2. Courts Construing Facts and Law in Plaintiffs’ Favor 
As stated above, not all of the cases where plaintiff survived had very 
strong facts. Some of them survived because the court took seriously its obliga-
tion to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—
almost always the plaintiff in these cases. For instance, in one case, the plaintiff 
was a gaming engineering specialist with severe dermatological issues that 
caused severe pain and disruptions.236 For many years, he had been allowed to 
work a flexible schedule where he made up hours later in the day, but at some 
point, the employer withdrew this accommodation.237 He requested to have the 
accommodation reinstated, but the employer refused, so if he came in late, he 
had to make up the time later in the day but he wouldn’t be paid for it.238 The 
plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on April 1, 2015, and almost immediately start-
ed suffering from retaliatory actions such as an unwarranted criminal investiga-
tion, being taken off projects, having his workload increased, and being subject 
                                                        
227  Id. 
228  Id. at 1312. 
229  Id. 
230  See id. at 1319. 
231  Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2013). 
232  Id. at 1173. 
233  Id. at 1175. 
234  Id. at 1180–81. 
235  Id. at 1181. 
236  Bridgewater v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 282 F. Supp. 3d 985, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2017). 
237  Id. at 988–90; see generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Withdrawn Accommodations, 63 
DRAKE L. REV. 885, 890 (2015) (discussing this phenomenon of employers withdrawing ac-
commodations that had previously been provided to employees with disabilities). 
238  Bridgewater, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 990–91. 
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to excessive monitoring.239 The court stated that it was difficult to characterize 
the unwarranted investigation and excessive monitoring as “petty slights or mi-
nor annoyances.”240 And because there were only seventeen days between his 
EEOC charges and the beginning of the investigation and excessive monitor-
ing, he had proven causation for purposes of surviving the employer’s motion 
for summary judgment.241 This case is interesting because I discussed above a 
case where the court had held that excessive monitoring was not an adverse 
employment action.242 
In another case, the plaintiff was an admissions director at a long-term care 
facility.243 After she broke her leg and took a leave of absence, the employer 
told her that she had to be 100% healed to be able to return.244 Her leave ex-
pired and again, the employer told her that she could not return without being 
able to perform all of the job functions with no restrictions.245 Because of this, 
she filed a charge of discrimination on August 30, 2012.246 On September 10, 
2012, she was released to return by her doctor but still had some restrictions on 
her walking.247 She asked for accommodations to be able to still perform tours 
of the facility, but the employer refused, and terminated her on September 18, 
2012.248 The court held that the close temporal proximity between her requests 
for accommodation and her termination, along with the employer’s language 
about not being able to return until she was 100% healed demonstrates retalia-
tory animus against her for requesting accommodations.249 This case was inter-
esting because there were many cases where plaintiffs did not survive their em-
ployers’ motions for summary judgment under similar factual scenarios as this 
case—i.e., where the employer refused additional leave and refused additional 
accommodations.250 
                                                        
239  Id. at 991. 
240  Id. at 1001. 
241  Id. 
242  See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing Aldrich v. Burwell, 197 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 
2016)). 
243  Consedine v. Willimansett E. SNF, 213 F. Supp. 3d 253, 256 (D. Mass. 2016). 
244  Id. at 256–57. 
245  Id. at 257. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. at 258. 
248  Id. at 258–59. 
249  Id. at 262. 
250  See, e.g., Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1150, 1167 (N.D. 
Ala. 2014) (stating that refusal to accommodate her disability by forcing her on leave rather 
than giving her a light duty assignment, is not evidence of retaliation); Anderson v. Procopy 
Techs., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 880, 883–85, 893–94 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (explaining that after 
plaintiff was diagnosed with epilepsy and couldn’t drive a forklift, he was forced on leave 
and terminated when the leave expired, and the court held that the five weeks between the 
plaintiff filing an EEOC charge because they forced him on leave, and the termination was 
not close enough to demonstrate causation). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
A. A New Narrative 
The common narrative surrounding retaliation claims is that they are often 
much more successful than discrimination claims.251 This is explained in part 
due to what is seen as a more relaxed standard of proof. Specifically, as ex-
plained earlier, a plaintiff in a retaliation suit only needs to have a reasonable 
belief that the employer engaged in a discriminatory action even if that belief is 
mistaken.252 This means that sometimes the retaliation claim survives even if 
the underlying claim (the harassment or discrimination claim) fails. The higher 
success rates of some retaliation cases might also be explained by the fact that 
the retaliation cause of action covers more harm than the discrimination doc-
trine.253 As noted above, the standard in Burlington Northern only requires that 
the adverse action is “materially adverse,” meaning that it would dissuade a 
reasonable employee from filing or supporting a claim of discrimination.254 
This covers a broader set of adverse actions than a discrimination claim. Be-
cause this is supposed to be a fact-sensitive inquiry, one would expect that most 
of these issues would have to be decided by a jury, and this would then lead to 
more plaintiffs surviving summary judgment in retaliation cases.255 And if cas-
es do get to a jury, there is some support for the idea that the jury is more likely 
to believe that a retaliatory motive was at play rather than a discriminatory mo-
tive.256 
Because of this common narrative, I will admit I was surprised to see the 
results of my study. Considering that surviving a motion for summary judgment 
should not be an onerous burden, it was surprising that only one-quarter of 
plaintiffs in my study were able to survive summary judgment in their ADA 
retaliation cases. What is unclear is whether this is something unique to disabil-
ity cases, or whether a study of Title VII retaliation claims during the same 
time period would reveal a similar result. Obviously, my study does not allow 
me to answer that question. 
But another question is whether there is something about ADA retaliation 
cases that might make them less successful than other retaliation cases? There 
might be. Because ADA retaliation claims can (and often do) involve a retalia-
tory action taken because a plaintiff has requested an accommodation for her 
disability, it’s possible that employers and courts are reacting negatively to the 
request for an accommodation. Prior to the ADAAA, when courts were narrow-
                                                        
251  See, e.g., B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 442 (2008); see also sources 
cited supra note 6. 
252  George, supra note 251, at 467. 
253  See id. at 468. 
254  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
255  George, supra note 251, at 469–70. 
256  Id. at 469. 
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ly interpreting the definition of disability, most scholars argued that the narrow 
construction indicated a “backlash” against the ADA.257 Scholars hypothesized 
that the most likely explanation for the hostility against ADA claims is that 
employers and courts consider reasonable accommodations to constitute “pref-
erential treatment” in the workplace.258 Thus, it’s possible that ADA retaliation 
claims might fare worse than other retaliation claims because of the hostility 
towards reasonable accommodations in the workplace. If so, then the broad-
ened definition of disability in the ADAAA does not have much hope of bring-
ing new life to the ADA. 
B. Room for Reform 
Because of the negative result in this study, the next step should be discus-
sions about future reform to allow more plaintiffs to bring successful ADA re-
taliation claims (or at least to survive summary judgment). This is especially 
important in ADA cases (perhaps even more important than Title VII retalia-
tion cases) because, as noted, the alleged protected activity of many of the 
plaintiffs in these cases is requesting an accommodation. If an employee feels 
deterred from requesting an accommodation because she is worried about her 
employer retaliating against her, the anti-discrimination goals of ADA will not 
be realized. 
Although fully exploring these reforms is beyond the scope of this article, 
my preliminary proposal is to reform the anti-retaliation law under the ADA to 
address some of the problems associated with all three elements of the prima 
facie case. Unfortunately, there is not an easy fix for the frequency with which 
courts conclude that the plaintiff has not proven that the employer’s alleged 
reason for the adverse employment action was pretextual. But if we were to 
improve the law surrounding the ADA retaliation prima facie case, there would 
be fewer cases where plaintiffs lose. 
First, we should abandon the requirement that the employee have a reason-
able belief that she was complaining about behavior that violated the ADA or 
that she had a reasonable belief that she was entitled to an accommodation she 
requested. In similar contexts, I argued that courts should dispense with the rea-
sonable requirement and only require that an employee have a good faith belief 
that she is complaining about conduct that violates the law and that she act rea-
                                                        
257  See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction to BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: 
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 1, 5–6 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006); Matthew 
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 19, 21–22 (2000). 
258  See Long, supra note 3, at 225; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Indi-
viduals with Disabilities and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
1099, 1113 (2014); Porter, Backlash, supra note 2, at 14 (arguing that the backlash is based 
on the fact that the “ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision confers special treatment 
on individuals with disabilities, and therefore, courts want to limit that special treatment to 
those who are considered truly deserving.”). 
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sonably in bringing the complaint.259 Other scholars have made similar argu-
ments in the Title VII context.260 The criticisms of the “reasonable” standard 
are several: it stifles the broad remedial goals of Title VII or other anti-
discrimination statutes (like the ADEA or the ADA);261 it places employees in 
an unfair catch-22 with respect to reporting harassment;262 it judges the reason-
ableness of the belief based on a judge’s law-trained perspective, rather than 
the perspective of a layperson;263 and informal complaints should be encour-
aged rather than discouraged.264 I agree with these reasons.265 
Second, we need to lower the threshold of harm to meet the “material ad-
verse” standard. The Supreme Court’s standard in Burlington Northern is not 
the problem. The problem, as noted by other scholars, is that the reasonable 
person standard has been interpreted by lower courts in a way that “fails to re-
flect the views of most reasonable people.”266 This is a similar problem to the 
one above—where courts allow their own perceptions of what is “reasonable” 
to cloud their judgment about how a reasonable person who is not a law-trained 
judge would feel or behave. In this context, it is likely that federal judges, who 
enjoy lifetime job security, would not be deterred from complaining about dis-
crimination because it would be very difficult for anyone to retaliate against 
them.267 Although arriving at a specific standard is not the subject of this arti-
cle, we do need to lower the threshold regarding what constitutes an “adverse 
employment action.” I am not suggesting that one dirty look is enough, but I 
am troubled by how frequently courts hold that snubbing or ostracizing an em-
ployee who engaged in protected activity is not an adverse employment ac-
tion.268 And yet the consequences of being ignored or ostracized in the work-
                                                        
259  Ann C. McGinley & Nicole Buonocore Porter, Public Policy and Workers’ Rights: 
Wrongful Discharge Discipline Actions and Reasonable Good-Faith Beliefs, 21 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 511, 533–43 (2017) (arguing that, in Chapter 5 of the Restatement of Em-
ployment Law—The Tort of Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy—, the draft-
ers should have eliminated the requirement that an employee has a “reasonable belief” that 
the conduct complained of violated the law); Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 
56–57 (arguing that the Title VII retaliation doctrine should be amended to eliminate the re-
quirement that an employee’s belief that the conduct she complained of violated the law be 
objectively reasonable). 
260  Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 102–03 (2005) [hereinafter Brake, 
Retaliation]; Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 165–66 
(2014) [hereinafter Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World]; Senn, supra note 17, at 2061. 
261  See, e.g., Brake, Retaliation, supra note 260, at 55; Senn, supra note 17, at 2048. 
262  See, e.g., Brake, Retaliation, supra note 260, at 77; Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 
supra note 260, at 138–44; Senn, supra note 17, at 2074–77. 
263  See, e.g., Brake, Retaliation, supra note 260, at 76–77, 82. 
264  See, e.g., id. at 78; Senn, supra note 17, at 2079–80. 
265  See Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 56–57. 
266  See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 57, at 2055; Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 
57. 
267  Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 55. 
268  See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1105–06 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding that being called a “cry baby” and “trouble maker” by supervisor was not 
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place can be “emotionally devastating” and very effective at punishing the 
complaining employee and discouraging others from exercising their rights in 
the workplace.269 
Third, I also find fault with the courts’ jurisprudence on the causation in-
quiry.270 As noted above, the determination of causation inevitably involves 
looking at the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the ad-
verse employment action.271 Very short gaps between the two events will help 
plaintiff prove her prima facie case.272 But most courts hold that the temporal 
proximity alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.273 
Moreover, courts take an overly restrictive view on what is “too long” to sup-
port an inference of causation. I have seen firsthand some employers waiting 
for six months or more before taking a retaliatory action. A savvy, well-
counseled employer knows that it cannot take an adverse employment action 
immediately after a harassment or discrimination complaint. But some employ-
ers simply bide their time, waiting until they can terminate or take other ad-
verse employment actions without the suspicion of retaliation.274 Overly strin-
gent temporal proximity rules ignore this reality. 
Thus, I propose that, when establishing the prima facie case of retaliation, 
which is not supposed to be an onerous burden, there should be a one-year cut-
off.275 Anything shorter than that would be presumed to meet the prima facie 
element of causation, and then the burden of production would shift to the em-
ployer to demonstrate a non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment ac-
tion.276 I recognize that this does not move the ball very far, because many of 
these cases turn on the third step of the burden-shifting framework—whether or 
not the plaintiff can prove that the defendant’s non-retaliatory reason for the 
action was pretextual—but it would at least force the court to analyze the pre-
text element.277 
                                                                                                                                
adverse action); Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(holding co-worker harassment, including name-calling, physical intimidation, false accusa-
tions, vandalizing belongings, and verbal threats, not retaliatory); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 
F.3d 779, 790 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding supervisors yelling at plaintiff and physically isolat-
ing him from other employees did not rise to level of adverse employment action); see also 
George, supra note 251, at 443. 
269  George, supra note 251, at 443. 
270  Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Risk of Complaining—Retaliation, 38 J. C. & U. L. 1, 7 (2011) 
(“The most difficult hurdle of retaliation plaintiffs . . . is showing a causal connection or link 
between the protected activity and the materially adverse employment action. Absent any 
remarks made by those responsible for the challenged decision, the most telling evidence 
may be the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action.”). 
271  See Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 56. 
272  George, supra note 251, at 458. 
273  Id. at 458–59. 
274  Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 55–56. 
275  Id. at 58. 
276  George, supra note 251, at 457. 
277  Id.; see also Porter, Ending Harassment, supra note 148, at 58. 
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CONCLUSION 
Post-ADAAA, many scholars believed that the expanded definition of dis-
ability would lead to many more meritorious claims. This article has demon-
strated that this hope has been unrealized when it comes to ADA retaliation 
claims. Courts continue to disable ADA retaliation claims after the ADAAA 
became effective. Although the goal of this article was to expose the problem 
rather than to fashion a solution, my hope is that we will continue to discuss 
ways we can reform retaliation law so more of these meritorious claims can 
survive the summary judgment stage. 
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